Reflections on my open letter about ethics to the editorial board of the journal EcoHealth

 

** A modified form of this letter was recently submitted to the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, but rejected. I will try another journal in due course - or, perhaps a longer article (perhaps for J Medical Ethics). Sentences enclosed by asterisks not in original. **

The underlying viral cause (SARS-Co-V-2) of COVID-19, though sometimes claimed as a “natural” zoonosis, transmitted by contact with an unknown animal sold in a Chinese market (Worobey et al. 2022) remains uncertain (Harrison and Sachs 2022). The leading alternative is that this virus emerged via a research-related accident, either during field collection, or laboratory escape, possibly following its genetic manipulation in Wuhan, China (Sachs et al. 2022).

Two key figures in this “origins debate” are journal editors, respectively of The Lancet (henceforth “Lancet”) (Richard Horton) and EcoHealth (Peter Daszak). Here, I discuss an open letter I sent (November 2022) to almost all of the extended EcoHealth editorial board (Butler 2022a).

My letter appealed for EcoHealth to consider appointing one or more ethical advisors, and for existing editorial advisers to recommend that the journal publish an editorial (or guest editorial) about the “gain of function research of concern” debate. Were EcoHealth to do this, it would revisit issues raised in a previous editorial to which I contributed, as one of the journal’s four co-editors at that time (Jeggo et al. 2012). ** None of the co-authors of this editorial declated any conflict of interest (COI). **

Background

In early 2020 I was commissioned to write a report, since published **(70 pages, 34 reviewers)**, into the causes and implications of COVID-19 (United Nations Environment Programme 2022). To do this, I immersed myself in the rapidly evolving COVID-19 literature. Almost immediately, I was struck by the unusual language of a then recent letter in Lancet (Calisher et al. 2020). It stated: “We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.” I recognised many of the letter’s 27 co-authors, five of whom are still associated with EcoHealth. Another author was (and is) director of the Wellcome Trust, thus one of the most powerful figures in global health.

I was dismayed by this letter’s assertion that scientists evaluating alternative hypotheses for the origin of SARS-CoV-2 were “conspiracists”. Was the letter intended to be intimidating, or was it simply clumsily phrased? Either way, it seemed to exert a chilling effect. Throughout 2020, no leading journal published anything to challenge this “unipolar” hypothesis, even though evidence for it remained slender. The media seemed to uncritically accept this position.

Partly inspired by the tenacity of the online group DRASTIC (Ryan, 2021) I eventually was able to express my opinion that a laboratory origin for SARS-CoV-2 was plausible in an editorial in the Journal of Human Security (Butler, 2020). Consequently, I became aware of a network of scientists, some senior, mostly based in Europe, who thought similarly. Almost immediately we submitted a letter to Lancet, responding to Calisher et al., hoping our logic would be rewarded by rapid publication. We were disappointed, despite appeal.

Changing track, we then wrote collaborative open letters (authors listed alphabetically) to newspapers (Butler et al. 2021a, Butler et al. 2021b). Though widely publicised, these lacked the scientific authority of Lancet. However, their publication seemed to help stimulate a letter in Science, written by a different group, which made similar key points: that considerable circumstantial evidence existed for a laboratory origin, and that it was unscientific to call the debate “closed” (Bloom et al. 2021). A globally recognised coronavirus researcher (Ralph Baric) was a co-signatory.

Editorial disputes over ethics

From soon after Calisher et al’s publication, though then publicly unknown, Dr Horton was concerned about Dr Daszak’s reluctance to acknowledge his COI in co-signing that letter, which he also organised (Suryanarayanan, 2020). Dr Horton’s dismay was revealed in his testimony to British parliamentarians (Science and Technology Committee 2021). Shortly after Dr Daszak’s COI was declared (Editors of the Lancet, 2021), our letter was accepted by Lancet (van Helden et al. 2021).

In October 2021, a serious rift among a group commissioned by Lancet to report into the pandemic was publicised (Cohen, 2021). The two key figures involved were Jeffrey Sachs (Commission chair) and (again) Dr Daszak, a member.  The key issue of concern, alleged by Dr Sachs, was Dr Daszak’s lack of transparency (Gray and Sachs, 2022). **Dr Daszak is not named, but the implication is clear to those who follow this closely.**

 

Conclusion

Irrespective of the pandemic’s true cause, and whether Dr Daszak has or had a genuine COI, many considered that he did, including Dr Horton. In my opinion, it would be wise for EcoHealth to publish a non-partisan editorial concerning the origin of SARS-Co-V-2 and which clearly acknowledges uncertainty and human imperfection. An alternative is to host a debate.

Few, if any, scientists allege any putative laboratory-associated deliberate release of SARS-CoV-2. However, Dr Baric and others acknowledge that work was done with viruses, in Chinese laboratories, with weak safety standards. If done in the US, much stricter conditions would be necessary (Jacobsen 2021).

Safety concerns at Chinese laboratories were expressed in 2019 by the head of the Wuhan laboratory biosafety committee (Zhiming 2019). Recent work shows that, in some Chinese laboratory settings, restrictively-dressed workers endure six hour shifts, when “they cannot eat, drink or relieve themselves” (Eban and Kao 2022). In such conditions, it is hard to imagine the absence of errors.

The risk of biohazards from recombinant DNA technology was recognized at the dawn of this scientific field (Report of Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules et al. 1974). A recent World Health Organisation report (2022) acknowledges that some gain-of-function research may involve “potential pandemic pathogens”, raising “significant biosafety and biosecurity risks”. Could SARS-Co-V-2 have arisen this way? The risk of genetically altered potentially pandemic pathogens has been explicitly recognised for years (Cambridge Working Group 2014), and implicitly for decades.

In the Anthropocene (Butler, 2016) understanding the risk that synthetic organisms may pose to global health should be no more surprising than the idea that greenhouse gases or biodiversity loss could influence human health was to pioneers of ecological health (Sargent, 1972, McMichael, 1993). ** Somehow - many people are resistant; I truly am reminded of the stubborn inability to recognise that climate change could be a health issue in the early 1990s; yet some of the people who seemed so forward thinking then are  not, on this issue.**

Laboratory-altered organisms should be recognized as central to planetary health and related fields, including One Health and EcoHealth (Butler, 2022b). The impacts of conflicts of interest need to be better acknowledged and recognized in this debate. Recognition of these issues by the EcoHealth board members will enhance the journal’s prestige, influence and longevity, and reward the field of researchers it serves.

References

Bloom, J.D., Y.A. Chan, R.S. Baric, et al. 2021. Investigate the origins of COVID-19. Science 372(6543): 694. https://doi.org/https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abj0016

 

Butler, C.D. 2016. Sounding the alarm: health in the Anthropocene. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 13: 665. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13070665

 

Butler, C.D. 2020. Plagues, pandemics, health security, and the war on nature. The Journal of Human Security 16(1): 53-57. https://doi.org/10.12924/johs2020.16010053

 
Butler, C.D., B. Canard, H. Cap, et al. 2021a. Call for a full and unrestricted international forensic investigation into the origins of COVID-19. Wall St Journal https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/COVID%20OPEN%20LETTER%20FINAL%20030421%20(1).pdf  Accessed November 8, 2022. 

Butler, C.D., H. Cap, J.-M. Claverie, et al. 2021b. Call for a full investigation into the origins of COVID-19. The New York Times. https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/virus-inquiries-pandemic-origins/d7a097a4c758a65a/full.pdf Accessed November 8, 2022.

 

Butler, C.D. 2022a. An open letter about ethics, to the editorial board of the journal EcoHealth. Global Change Musings https://globalchangemusings.blogspot.com/2022/11/an-open-letter-about-ethics-to.html Accessed November 8, 2022.

Butler, C.D. 2022b. Comparing two United Nations Environment Programme reports on COVID-19. Science in One Health: 100003 doi: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soh.2022.100003

Calisher, C., D. Carroll, R. Colwell, et al. 2020. Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and medical professionals of China combatting COVID-19. The Lancet 395: e42-43.  https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30418-9

 

Cambridge Working Group. 2014. Consensus statement on the creation of potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs). http://www.cambridgeworkinggroup.org/documents/statement.pdf Accessed November 8, 2022. 

 

Cohen, J. 2021. Fights over confidentiality pledge and conflicts of interest tore apart COVID-
19 origin probe. Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.acx9371

 

Eban, K. and J. Kao. 2022. COVID-19 origins: investigating a “complex and grave situation” inside a Wuhan Lab. Vanity Fair. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/10/covid-origins-investigation-wuhan-lab Accessed November 8, 2022. 

 

Editors of The Lancet. 2021. Addendum: competing interests and the origins of SARS-CoV-2. The Lancet https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01377-510.1016/S0140-6736(21)01377-5 

 

Gray, B.J. and J.D. Sachs. 2022. Lab leak theory: new evidence? Bad Faith. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZa5k87ByOkAccessed November 8, 2022. 

 

Harrison, N.L. and J.D. Sachs. 2022. A call for an independent inquiry into the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (USA) 119(21): e22027691. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2202769119

Jacobsen, R. 2021. “We never created a supervirus.” Ralph Baric explains gain-of-function research. MIT Technology Review https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/26/1030043/gain-of-function-research-coronavirus-ralph-baric-vaccines/ Accessed November 8, 2022. 

 

Jeggo, M., C. Butler, F. Jing, P. Weinstein and P. Daszak. 2012. EcoHealth and the influenza A/H5N1 dual use issue. EcoHealth 9(1): 1-3.https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10393-012-0768-4

 

McMichael, A.J. 1993. Planetary Overload. Global Environmental Change and the Health of the Human Species. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Report of Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, P. Berg, D. Baltimore, et al. 1974. Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA molecules. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (USA) 71(7): 2593-2594. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.71.7.2593

Ryan, J. 2021. How the coronavirus origin story is being rewritten by a guerrilla Twitter group. CNET Insider newsletter. https://www.cnet.com/science/features/how-thecoronavirus-origin-story-is-being-rewritten-by-a-guerrilla-twitter-group/ Accessed November 9, 2022. Link ok

Sachs, J.D., S.S. A. Karim, L. Aknin, et al. 2022. The Lancet Commission on lessons for the future from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Lancet 400(10359): 1224-1280.  https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)01585-9

Sargent, F. 1972. Man-environment—problems for public health. The American Journal of Public Health 62(5): 628-633. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.62.5.62810.2105/ajph.62.5.628

Science and Technology Committee. 2021. Evidence session on research. https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/135/science-and-technologycommittee/news/159684/science-and-technology-committee-holds-evidence-session-onresearch/ Accessed November 8, 2022.

Suryanarayanan, S. 2020. EcoHealth Alliance orchestrated key scientists’ statement on “natural origin” of SARS-CoV-2. https://usrtk.org/covid-19-origins/ecohealth-alliance-orchestrated-key-scientists-statement-on-natural-origin-of-sars-cov-2/ Accessed November 8, 2022.

United Nations Environment Programme. 2022. COVID-19: a warning. Addressing environmental threats and the risk of future pandemics in Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok, Thailand, United Nations Environment Programme, https://wedocs.unep.org/20.500.11822/40871 Accessed 21 October, 2022.

van Helden, J., C.D. Butler, G. Achaz, et al. 2021. An appeal for an objective, open and transparent scientific debate about the origin of SARS-CoV-2. The Lancet 398(10309): 1402–1404. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02019-5

World Health Organization. 2022. Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences. Mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research, Geneva, Switzerland, World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240056107 Accessed November 8, 2022.

Worobey, M., J.I. Levy, L.M.M. Serrano, et al. 2022. The Huanan market was the epicenter
of SARS-CoV-2 emergence. Science 377: 951–959. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abp8715

Zhiming, Y. 2019. Current status and future challenges of high-level biosafety laboratories in China. Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity 1(2): 123-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobb.2019.09.005

 

An open letter about ethics, to the editorial board of the journal EcoHealth

This is a minimally modified letter version of a letter sent to 99 of the 105 people listed as affiliated with the editorial board of the journal EcoHealth, for whom I could locate valid email addresses. It was originally sent on November 6, 2022. I am the sole author.

Hyperlinks not in original, text marked between asterisks added, e.g **text added **. An erroneous url address has been corrected.

So far (November 16, 2023) five of these 99 people have responded in a substantial way (on topic). One mixed, one very supportive, two supportive, one a bit hostile.

I will update this summary from time to time.

28 Sept 2023. I am aware two have resigned, in part because of their discomfort over this issue. Two more have left, I don't know the reasons as yet. No one new has joined. One co-authored an essay with me, published in the Daily Mail called "There has been a suppression of the truth, secrecy and cover-ups on an Orwellian scale"

COVER LETTER:

Dear Dr,

I am writing to you (see attached letter) because of your role in the journal EcoHealth, a journal I was associated with from its inception until my resignation, as a co-editor, in 2013. This letter appeals for EcoHealth to publish an editorial (or a guest editorial) which revisits the debate over “gain of function” research, to follow its earlier one, from 2012 (for which I was a co-author, as are several recipients of this email).

That biohazards can result from recombinant DNA technology was recognized in the 1970s, and the concept that such organisms can harm human health should be no more challenging today (in the Anthropocene) than the idea that greenhouse gases or biodiversity loss could influence human health was to pioneers in those fields, including my mentor, the late Prof Tony McMichael (a co-editor, with Pim Martens and Jonathan Patz, of one of the two main precursor journals of EcoHealth).

I appeal for you to read the attached letter (2 pages) with an open mind, and, if you are sympathetic, use your influence with Ecohealth and its parent association to explore and develop these ideas.

Kindest Regards

Colin

Colin Butler PhD, MSc, BMed, DTM&H 

Honorary Professor, National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University, Australia

Member of Scientific Advisory Committee: Doctors for the Environment, Australia

https://researchers.anu.edu.au/researchers/butler-cdd
http://colindbutler.weebly.com/
http://www.bodhi-australia.com/
http://health-earth.weebly.com

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2942-5294

colin.butler@anu.edu.au 

 

***

ATTACHED LETTER:

Dear Dr

I am writing to you because of your connection with the journal EcoHealth, a journal I was associated with from its inception until my resignation, in 2013 (at which time I was a co-editor).

EcoHealth is stated as a central platform for fulfilling the mission of the EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), which is to “strive for sustainable health of people, domestic animals, wildlife, and ecosystems by promoting discovery, understanding, and transdisciplinarity” (1).

This description of EHA’s mission omits the word ethics, but I believe it is implicit, especially in the words “strive for sustainable health”. Furthermore, ethics is relevant to all scientific endeavour.

You, are, of course, aware of the ongoing catastrophe of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of you will be aware of its potential link with “gain of function” research, defined recently in a report by WHO (2) as:

"Research that results in the acquisition of new biological phenotypes, or an enhancement of existing phenotypes. Gain-of-function research that is anticipated to enhance the transmissibility or virulence (or both) of potential pandemic pathogens raises significant biosafety and biosecurity risks, as well as dual-use concerns that may warrant additional oversight’.

Some of you will know that the Lancet Commission about SARS-Co-V-2 (3) concluded that:

“The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2 remains unknown. There are two leading hypotheses: that the virus emerged as a zoonotic spillover from wildlife or a farm animal, possibly through a wet market, in a location that is still undetermined; or that the virus emerged from a research related incident, during the field collection of viruses or through a laboratory-associated escape.”

The key message of an even more recent report (released October 20, 2022) published by the United Nations Environment Programme (4) into the pandemic makes a similar case, stating as a “key message” that:

"The leading hypothesis to explain its origin is that the causal virus, SARS-CoV-2 (a coronavirus) has evolved naturally in an ecological milieu in which different species of farmed or smuggled animals, or both, exist in proximity. A more speculative hypothesis is that the causal virus either escaped from a laboratory after either being brought there for purposes of study or escaped after evolving in a laboratory owing to experimentation."

This report **(for which I am sole author)** concludes:

“it is possible that the crisis caused by the current pandemic will lead to a fundamental awakening to the danger of humanity’s recent trajectory, energizing reforms such as improved governance and cooperation, a new economic system, greater respect for nature and reduced corruption. To this end, greater transparency is required, particularly concerning the ethics of gain of function research.”

A letter (in press) **(for which I am sole author)** (5) comparing this UNEP report with another UNEP report (published in 2020) (6) argues that “Critics of such experimentation (i.e. gain of function of concern) argue that it has profound risks, and requires exemplary governance, transparency and oversight if it is to be safely undertaken.

This letter also proposes that laboratory created (or “laboratory-nurtured”) organisms (such as evolving by serial passage in animal models, including genetically altered animal models, such as mice with human airway cells), should be regarded as “novel entities”. As most of you know, this is one of the planetary boundaries, and thus is relevant to planetary health. By extension, such organisms are relevant to ecohealth and to One Health. This letter also points out that the foreword to the recent WHO report, written by the WHO chief scientist, already links “biorisk management” to One Health.

The risk of creating potentially pandemic pathogens was explicitly recognised in the Cambridge Declaration (2014) (7) but it is also implicit in the warning given by the Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, chaired by Paul Berg. In 1974 this committee stated:

“Several groups of scientists are now planning to use this technology to create recombinant DNAs from a variety of other viral, animal, and bacterial sources. Although such experiments are likely to facilitate the solution of important theoretical and practical biological problems, they would also result in the creation of novel types of infectious DNA elements whose biological proper they would also result in the creation of novel types of infectious DNA elements whose biological properties cannot be completely predicted in advance. There is serious concern that some of these artificial recombinant DNA molecules could prove biologically hazardous” (8).

These ideas are surely no more challenging today (in the Anthropocene) than the concept that greenhouse gases or biodiversity loss could influence human health was to pioneers in those fields, including my mentor, the late Prof Tony McMichael (a co-editor, with Pim Martens, and Jonathan Patz, of Global Change and Human Health, one of the two main precursor journals of EcoHealth).

I therefore appeal, **if you are sympathetic** for each of you to use your influence with Ecohealth and its parent association to explore these ideas.

I also recommend that “ethics” be more prominent on the EcoHealth website, and that you consider appointing several ethical advisors. I also recommend that EcoHealth publish an editorial (or a guest editorial) which revisits the debate over “gain of function” research, to follow its earlier one, from 2012 (for which I was a co-author, as are several recipients of this email) (9).

References

1. https://www.springer.com/journal/10393/aims-and-scope

2. WHO (2022) Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible use of the Life Sciences. Mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240056107

3. Sachs J.D., Karim S.S.A., Aknin L., et al. (2022) The Lancet Commission on lessons for the future from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Lancet; 400: 1224-1280. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)01585-9

4. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2022) COVID-19: A Warning. Addressing Environmental Threats and the Risk of Future Pandemics in Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok, Thailand: UNEP. https://wedocs.unep.org/20.500.11822/40871

5. Butler C.D. (2022) Comparing two United Nations Environment Programme reports on COVID-19. Science in One Health: 100003. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soh.2022.100003

6. UNEP (2020) Preventing the Next Pandemic: Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of transmission. Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP. https://www.unep.org/resources/report/preventing-future-zoonotic-disease-outbreaks-protecting-environment-animals-and

7. Cambridge Working Group. (2014) Consensus statement on the creation of potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs). http://www.cambridgeworkinggroup.org/documents/statement.pdf

8. Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, Berg P., Baltimore D., et al. (1974) Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA molecules. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (USA); 71(7): 2593-4.  https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.71.7.2593

9. Jeggo M., Butler C., Jing F., Weinstein P., Daszak P. (2012) EcoHealth and the influenza A/H5N1 dual use issue. EcoHealth; 9: 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10393-012-0768-4